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1. Introduction 
When addressing a certain subject it is usually the first responsibility of a 
political scientist to define the subject he wants to explore and to explain. 
Otherwise the audience would not be able to understand what the speaker is 
talking about. What could we mean when we are talking about regions and 
their role in the ongoing, indeed path breaking, Constitutional process led 
by the Convention on the future of Europe? The first problem is that a clear 
definition of what "regions" are does not exist. Nevertheless, in my consid-
erations on the subject I will conceptualise "regions" as a kind of "third 
level" in the European multilevel governance system. From this broader 
and more general governance perspective it is possible to make a general 
observation which is important to keep in mind: It is one of the most 
important implications of European integration, or better: Europeanisation, 
that we face a multiplication of extra-national channels for subnational po-
litical activity.
2 Territorial relations are being transformed: nation states are 
losing control over important areas of decision-making while a variety of 
 
1  Lecture held at the Workshop “European Regions in the Laeken Process: Real Play-
ers or only Spectators?”, organised by the Center for European Integration Studies 
(ZEI) in Bonn and the Representation of North Rhine Westphalia to the European 
Union, Brussels, November 14, 2002. 
 
2  See Hooghe, Liesbet/Marks, Gary: „Europe with the Regions“: Channels of Re-
gional Representation in the European Union, in: Publius: The Journal of Federal-
ism 26, pp. 73-91. Marcus Höreth 
new channels have been created for regional mobilisation, and subnational 
governments are engaged in innovative, transnational patterns of interac-
tion. Regional governments are no longer constrained to dyadic political 
relations with national state actors, but interact with a variety of actors in 
diverse arenas and in several formal and informal networks. This is indi-
cated for example by the fact that regional governments from several mem-
ber states have set up independent offices in Brussels. But of course regions 
do not engage in these transnational European activities equally. 
As this is not a very exciting observation, I will return to the key question: 
what role could powerful regions play in future Europe? Several scenarios 
are possible, and especially the scenarios offered by representatives of con-
stitutional regions are rather optimistic. Their basic premise is that a strong 
Europe needs strong regions as its constituent units. On the one hand this 
perspective is justified and legitimated, and, usually the underlying argu-
ments of this thesis are craftily developed. On the other hand, alternative, 
even opposite, views are also possible. In order to demonstrate this rather 
pessimistic argument, I imagine Europe’s future, say in the year 2007, after 
the new Constitutional treaty is in force as such. Under this new treaty the 
regions have the rights and powers, which they should have following the 
proposals made in the Convention’s working group documents and follow-
ing some proposals of some Members of the Convention. In other words, 
seen from the perspective of the regions, dreams will come true. As I will 
be a little more critical, my reflections are labelled under the provocative 
title “Do Dreams or Nightmares come true? The role of powerful regions in 
future Europe”. I will present my critical, sometimes polemic reflections in 
two steps. First, I will offer a short view on the “dream” expressed by the 
“Assembly of European Regions”
3 in view of the hearing at the European 
Convention at the end of June 2002. In a second step I imagine the situation 
in a couple of years, after all these dreams of the regions dreams come true, 
and will make some critical comments on the role of powerful regions in 
future Europe.  
 
3  Assembly of the European Regions: The European Convention, 2002 
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II. The Dream 
So what is the dream? Obviously, especially the constitutional regions try 
to be powerful players in the constitutional process despite the fact that 
their representatives are not equipped with formal voting power within the 
decision-making process of the Convention. Of course we have some de-
facto regional representatives in the Convention with formal voting power, 
in the German case it is Erwin Teufel, Prime Minister of Baden-
Württemberg, but seen from a European top-down perspective he does not 
represent a region but only a second chamber the German Parliament, 
which, by the way, does not exist in Germany in a constitutional sense. 
Nevertheless, especially the constitutional regions are highly engaged in 
influencing the choices of the Convention, and, more directly, the choices 
of their national representatives in this Convention.
4 Not a week passes 
without a new communication, statement, or manifesto of a regional or-
ganisation or the Committee of the Regions. Interestingly enough, these 
papers address not only matters of direct regional concern, i.e. subsidiarity, 
autonomy of legislative regions, the used implementation methods and so 
on, but they are also very engaged in big constitutional questions like the 
democratic deficit, the institutional relationship within the Triangle Com-
mission-Council-Parliament, the question of a Union presidency, the Un-
ion’s general capacity for action and so on.  
Right at the top of the constitutional regions priority list ranks the concept 
of subsidiarity. It is, therefore, a cornerstone of the region’s dream how the 
Union should look like in future. In this perspective, the principle of sub-
sidiarity is not only a word, but a fact as it should be explicitly applied with 
regard to the regions. In their view regions form the ideal middle ground 
between the unity and diversity that characterise the European Union of the 
future. They express cultural autonomy, they increase democratic legiti-
 
4  In Germany the „Bundesländer“ are very successful in influencing the German 
European policy choices since they are equipped with powerful instruments through 
the new Art. 23 of the German Constition. See Große Hüttmann, Martin: Die Euro-
päisierung des deutschen Föderalismus, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte; in com-
parision with the Belgian case Roller, Gerhard: Die Mitwirkung der deutschen Län-
der und der belgischen Regionen an EG-Entscheidungen, in: AöR 123, pp. 21-59. 
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macy, they lead to the separation of powers, and they integrate the citizens 
into the polity. Therefore, in constitutional terms, European governance 
and law making should be allowed on the following basis: a) (only limited) 
exclusive competences of the Union, b) (some) shared competences and c) 
supplementary competences of the European Union. In order to protect the 
regional communities, the division of competences should be verified by a 
mixed body to be set up parallel to the European Court of Justice. At least, 
the regions should have the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice 
in order to preserve their rights and competences in the framework of the 
European and national constitutional orders. Moreover, at the Union level, 
the role of the regions should be strengthened by enhancing their influence 
in European decision-making. This could be done at best by institutionalis-
ing the Committee of the Regions as a kind of third chamber next to the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 
III. When Dreams come true: Powerful Regions in 
Europe 
What would happen with Europe when all these dreams mentioned above 
will come true? It could be characterised by the following facts: 
•  As you can imagine, the phrase in Article 1 TEU “an ever closer Un-
ion” is not replaced by the words “A United States of Europe” or 
something similar, but with “The United Regions of Europe”. Of 
course this is exaggerated, but sometimes one might have the im-
pression that regions overestimate their importance in the constitu-
tional architecture of the European Union. Realistically, the states of 
course remain the Masters of the Treaties in the near future. And this 
is not a bad thing. 
•  In order to secure the principle of subsidiarity,  
-  every constitutional or legislative region  
- the  Commission 
-  a minority in the Council 
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-  and a minority in the European Parliament 
has the right to refer before the Court before a European legislative act 
(regulations, directives) comes into force when they think this act infringes 
on principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This could lead to an even 
more cumbersome European decision-making process. Whenever a minor-
ity is overruled by a majority, be it in the Council or in the European Par-
liament, this minority is still able to prevent undesired political outcomes 
by turning to the judges in Luxemburg. In a comparative constitutional 
politics perspective we can observe that this manoeuvre is well-known in 
all polities with powerful Constitutional Courts. At least – with this judicial 
weapon in their hand – these minorities are able to postpone undesired leg-
islative acts or, at least, they are able to set the majority under political 
pressure. If one tends to be pessimistic in this question, interested regions 
could even be able to blackmail European decision-makers. The motto of 
these minorities, no matter where they are coming from, could be: “Do this 
or that for us, compensate us, give us a side-payment, otherwise we go to 
Luxemburg!” You will always find some political minorities who lose out 
in the decision-making process who can find an argument when referring to 
subsidiarity and so you will always find a way to Luxemburg to block 
European legislation. At least this mechanism is a great incentive for nego-
tiating additional package deals behind closed doors. Under these circum-
stances it is only wishful thinking to believe that the future Union will be 
characterised by more transparency and a clearer fulfilment of the principle 
of accountability. How then, given the statements by the Assembly of 
European Regions I mentioned above, could such conditions “enhance de-
mocratic legitimacy”? It is of course also wishful thinking to believe that 
the future Union could be able to enhance its capacity and ability for action 
if you endow political minorities, say regions for instance, with this judicial 
weapon to hinder legislative action.  
•  Moreover, the principle of subsidiarity is not only the subject to ex 
post judicial review by the European Court of Justice. It is also guar-
anteed by the Constitutional Treaty that national parliaments (includ-
ing regional parliaments, at least German’s Second Chamber, the 
Bundesrat) are able to organise ex ante political monitoring of the 
  7Marcus Höreth 
principle of subsidiarity.
5 This “early warning system” is even more. 
It is functioning as an “early blocking system”. In the Union we 
really do not have the problem that there are not enough veto-players 
in the political arena. In the future we will also have national parlia-
ments who are in fact able to veto important decisions at the Euro-
pean level. It is to expect that you will always find national parlia-
ments who do not want to accept that a certain decision is made at 
the European level. 
•  Regions are more and more not only responsible for the implementa-
tion of Union policies but also in European decision-making proc-
esses – via national and European channels (Committee of the Re-
gions). This is not a very comfortable situation for national govern-
ments since they lose power – vis-à-vis the European level and vis-à-
vis the regional level. If it is true that the European multilevel gov-
ernance system could be described as a sandwich, one might say that 
the sausage smashed between the two sandwich halves is becoming 
thinner and thinner. One may indeed be left asking, “where’s the 
beef?!” Regions may win autonomy and federal decision-making 
power, but only at the cost of autonomy and decision-making power 
of central governments. The integration process is partially the rea-
son why more and more member state governments lose power and 
influence vis-à-vis their sub-national regions. Take Spain as an ex-
ample to see what results an overstretched regionalism can produce 
in the end. In Catalonia only Catalonian speaking people can be of-
fice-holders in the public service. Moreover, in Catalonian schools 
the Spanish language is after English only a second “foreign” lan-
guage while Catalonian is the official native language pupils have to 
learn. Is there something we can learn from these examples? If yes, 
then it leads us to the conclusion that too much independence and 
autonomy for the legislative regions would not only threaten the 
European Union. They would also threaten the “masters of the Trea-
 
5  Chairman of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity: Conclusions of 
Working Group I, The European Convention – Secretariat, Brussels, 23 September 
2002, CONV 286/02, p. 3. 
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ties” themselves, the nation states, which are historically the well-
established, and still the only existing frameworks of democracy, 
burden-sharing solidarity and human rights protection. At least the 
Spanish example teaches us that not everything under the banner of 
“subsidiarity” is a worthy contribution for the constitutional architec-
ture of our Union. 
•  The new Article 6 TEU will contain the provision that the Union re-
spects regional and local self-government. This is indeed a necessary 
and worthy principle. But given the cross-border nature of many 
problems we face today we have to achieve a truly united Europe. 
Therefore, the regions conversely must respect the benefits of a func-
tioning and efficient decision-making system at the European level. 
Moreover, regions must allow the architects of Europe a certain 
amount of leverage in laying down the common rules which define 
the space in which a half billion citizens make the European Union a 
reality. However, the visions of the founding fathers would be totally 
undermined if the regions cry bloody murder whenever the Union 
seeks to fulfil its responsibility for bringing the citizens of Europe 
together through appropriate directives, regulations, and decisions.  
•  Moreover, the European Constitution will contain an explicit text 
stating that “all powers not conferred on the Union by the Constitu-
tional Treaty remains with the Regions”. Again, this is exaggerated, 
but sometimes one may have the impression that this is exactly the 
attitude of some very convinced lobbyists of strong regions in 
Europe. 
•  The powerful regions are able to decide themselves if a Community 
measure is appropriate at their territory which they govern and in 
which they have legislative power. This is still an unspoken intention 
of powerful and strong regional governments in Bavaria, Flanders or 
the regions in Northern Italy. I admit that this scenario is not a hot is-
sue at the moment but imagine that also this dream comes true in fu-
ture. What is the principle of solidarity for example in Article 2 TEC 
worth if strong regions are able to “opt-out” whenever they feel the 
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need to stress their egoistic regional interests in opposition to broader 
European interests or interests of poorer regions? Remember that 
solidarity is actually a worthy but also fragile and contested constitu-
tional principle. This is the case not only in the multinational Euro-
pean Union, but also in well-developed nation states such as Ger-
many, Belgium or Italy where the principle of solidarity is frequently 
challenged by the “haves” against the “have-nots”. This is for exam-
ple indicated by the fact that in Germany the richer Bundesländer are 
more and more unwilling to pay financial transfers to poorer regions 
in the mechanism of the so-called “Länderfinanzausgleich”. 
IV. Conclusions: Powerful Regions in future Europe: a 
Dream or a Nightmare? 
I am aware of the fact that I painted the devil on the wall regarding the role 
of strong regions in future Europe. This provocative statement tries only to 
sharpen the consciousness that in a contested polity like the EU,
6 any over-
stretching of legitimating ideas, as is the idea of a strong Europe through 
strong regions, also has its negative implications.
7 The overstretched 
dreams of the strong regions in Europe could develop to nightmare scenar-
ios very soon. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out, that regions, espe-
cially constitutional regions have legitimate interests within the ongoing 
constitutional process. But what I intended to demonstrate is that powerful 
regions do not automatically lead to a powerful European Union, as is al-
ways claimed by the proponents of this “third-level-philosophy”. There-
fore, not only the Union has to respect the legitimate interests of regions, 
but also, conversely, the regions must respect the benefits of a functioning 
and efficient decision-making system at the European level. Moreover, re-
 
6  See only Lord, Christopher: Legitimation traps, problems and solutions, an the role 
of the Convention on the future of Europe, paper presented at the SWP Conference: 
Democracy and Accountability in the Enlarged European Union, 7/8 March, 2003, 
paper available under: http://www.swp-berlin.org/pdf/conveu/Lord.pdf 
7  See for a fully developed version of this argument Höreth, Marcus: Die Europäische 
Union im Legitimationstrilemma. Zur Rechtfertigung des Regierens jenseits der 
Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden 1999. 
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gions must allow the architects of Europe a certain amount of leverage in 
laying down the common rules which define the space in which a half bil-
lion citizens make the European Union a reality. However, the visions of 
the Community founding fathers would be totally undermined if the re-
gions cry bloody murder whenever the Union seeks to fulfil its responsibil-
ity for bringing the citizens of Europe together through appropriate direc-
tives, regulations, and decisions. It is to hope that the Convention Members 
are still breathing this philosophy of the Community’s founding fathers. 
From their perspective, then, the dreams of the constitutional regions are 
important to take into account, but their complete fulfilment should not be 
their most urgent concern.  
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